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Abstract
The determinants of international currency received a lot of academic atten-
tion since great recession, especially given China’s intention to internationalize
RMB. Recent empirical studies in history and international economics con-
firmed the importance of financial market development in this process. To
provide micro-foundation for such observation, I built a two-country monetary
search model with financial friction. Trade takes time, and the lack of trust
makes importer and exporter rely on bank-intermediated finance. The choice
of international currency is related with terms of trade, monetary policy, and
financial market development. The effect of monetary policy on international
trade differs according to currency regime. Related topic such as size effect and
capital account liberalization is also discussed.
∗I’m indebted to Wing Woo for continuous guidance and support. I also thank Athanasios
Geromichalos, Seungduck Lee, and Mingzhi Xu for helpful comments and suggestions.
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1 Introduction
The international monetary system came under serious doubt after the global finan-
cial crisis in 2008. Many alternatives have been proposed to replace the exorbitant
privilege of US dollar, such as SDR (Zhou, 2009), a multipolar system (Eichengreen,
2011), and a single world currency (Mundell, 2012). Beyond the political implication
of such a dramatic power shift, it’s economically interesting to consider the determi-
nants of international currency, especially the rise-up of a previously national currency
and the possibility of multiple international currencies.
Here international currency is defined as a fiat money not only circulating in its
home country but also held by foreigners. As a store of value, it could be central bank’s
foreign reserve or private person’s investment instrument. As a medium of exchange,
it could smooth government’s foreign exchange intervention or settle international
trade. As a unit of account, it denominates financial transaction or becomes the
anchor of other currencies. Table 1 summarized these functions. This paper is mainly
concerned with medium of exchange as the function of international currency.
Academic research traditionally focused on economy of scale and path dependence
in the evolution of international currency (e.g., Krugman, 1979, Rey, 2001). In this
view, size effect is important since trade volume helps reduce transaction cost. The
status of international currency therefore requires a large economy. This size effect
also ensures path dependence and incumbency advantage so that, once a currency
becomes international, people have no incentive of deviation.
Historical experience of international trade and monetary system, however, shows
another picture. US GDP surpassed Great Britain in 1870s, and US share of world
export surged from 14.1% in 1872 to 22.1% in 1913, but the international role of US
dollar was essentially zero, while Sterling is estimated to have invoiced over 60% of
world trade by early twentieth century (Broz, 1997). Similarly, China became the
leader of international merchandise trade in 2013 by WTO estimation, but RMB re-
mains national. The advantage of incumbency is also open to question. Eichengreen
and Flandreau (2012) showed that US dollar and sterling shared the status of inter-
national currency as early as 1920s. Recent empirical literature used new dataset to
emphasize the importance of financial development. One leading research is Ito and
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Chinn (2013) that documented the relationship between capital account liberalization
and trade invoice currency, attributing RMB’s low degree of internationalization to
the drawback of its financial system.
This paper tries to provide micro-foundation for such observation and discuss
monetary policy in different currency regimes. To that end, I incorporated financial
friction into the two-country model in Zhang (2014). In my model, trade takes time,
and agents disagree on the timing of shipment and payment, so they rely on bank-
intermediated finance. Agent’s choice of international currency is related with terms
of trade, monetary policy, and financial market development. Three currency regimes
naturally arise: single international currency, producer currency pricing (PCP), and
local currency pricing (LCP). The impact of monetary policy on trade and welfare
would differ according to currency regime.
This paper also follows a long tradition of explicitly modeling bank and credit
since Diamond and Dybvig (1983). One difficulty in this field is that, as pointed out
by Berentsen et al. (2007), there must be an absence of record keeping for money to be
essential, but credit requires record keeping in case of default. The inherent tension
between money and credit is not present in this model thanks to the institutional
setup of trade finance: importer has no incentive to default since that would make
him lose the ownership of goods purchased from exporter. Money could coexist with
credit in an environment without record keeping, and credit improves welfare by
facilitating trade.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Part 2 reviews economic literature on
international currency. Part 3 documents the practice of trade finance, especially the
mechanism of letter of credit (LC). Part 4 describes model environment and defines
monetary equilibrium. Part 5 undergoes discussion on related topic with numerical
example. Part 6 concludes.
2 Literature review
Academic research on international currency spans economics and politics. Interested
reader could refer to Be´nassy-Que´re´ (2015) for a systematic review. This section is
focused on economic theories that regarded international currency as the outcome of
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decentralized choice by private sector.
2.1 Trade model
This strand of literature mostly used a general equilibrium model of 3-country or
N-country to explain the phenomenon of international vehicle currency (for example,
Krugman, 1979; Rey, 2001; Devereux and Shi, 2013). International vehicle currency
(IVC) is issued by (say) country A but used in the bilateral trade between country B
and C. In models of this fashion, producer and consumer hold only home currency, and
foreign exchange transaction is undertaken by financial intermediary or trading post,
which has an increasing-return-to-scale technology that lowers transaction cost with a
large trade volume. With the assumption of cash in advance and PCP, agent’s choice
of invoicing currency is exogenously given. The existence of a general equilibrium with
IVC is crucially dependent on economic openness. Therefore, the currency issued by
a country intensively engaged in international trade would emerge as IVC. This thick
market or network externality also makes the status of IVC a natural monopoly. The
advantage of such model comes from its nature of general equilibrium: the welfare
gain of using IVC could be analyzed, and discussion of monetary policy is feasible. An
obvious drawback is the lack of micro-foundation. Agent’s choice of invoicing currency
is exogenous, so it’s impossible to explain the rise and fall of different currency regimes.
2.2 Micro-structure model
With the increasing data availability at firm and industry level, a microeconomic
theory of invoicing currency prospers in recent years. Bacchetta and Van Wincoop
(2005) showed that producer’s invoicing choice is affected by competition in foreign
markets: higher level of exporter’s market share and differentiation tends to promote
PCP. Goldberg and Tille (2008) continued this approach and showed that producers
in industries with high demand elasticities are more likely to herding in the choice of
invoicing currency, which was verified by a dataset of 24 countries. Another approach
is in Goldberg and Tille (2013), where the choice of invoicing currency is solved in
a Nash bargaining game between exporter and importer, and the outcome is related
with elements of market structure such as fragmentation, heterogeneity, and risk
4
tolerance. For all its significance and excellency, micro-structure model is not explicit
about the underlying process of currency circulation and exchange. Producer’s choice
mainly reflects uncertainty of demand and exchange rate. In addition, most of these
models are partial equilibrium, making it improper for welfare analysis and policy
discussion.
2.3 Search model
Search theory is seemingly born to discuss the determinants of international currency,
with its inherent advantage in answering why fiat money circulates as medium of ex-
change. Earlier studies of first-generation theory employed two-country two-currency
model, but suffered from the indivisibility of output and money, as in Matsuyama
et al. (1993). Second-generation theory endogenized output by bargaining, as in
Trejos and Wright (1996), but still couldn’t reach equilibrium.
With the breakthrough in Lagos and Wright (2005), search theory is now widely
applied to topics in international macroeconomics. This paper is closest in method-
ology to Zhang (2014), who used an information-based theory to discuss the deter-
minants of international currency and its implication for monetary policy, but my
approach is different in several aspects. First, there is an additional round of finan-
cial market since exporter and importer rely on bank-intermediated finance for trade
settlement. Second, the cost of using a certain currency comes from the fixed cost
in banking sector, which is more realistic than information cost. This means home
currency use is also costly, so agents make a binary choice of using home or foreign
currency, and distinct currencies are no longer perfect substitutes. Lastly, the role of
government is not explicitly stipulating home currency use. Instead, it would decide
on whether to absorb the initial cost of financial market and make its own currency
international.
3 International trade finance
The timing of payment and delivery is always a big issue for international trade.
Without mutual trust or history record, the direct and bilateral trade between buyer
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and seller would bring in a lot of uncertainty: buyers don’t know whether they could
get goods after payment, and sellers are not guaranteed that they would get paid
after delivery. According to the timing of payment and delivery, the pattern of trade
finance could be generally classified into three groups: Cash-in-advance (payment
before delivery), Open account (payment after delivery), and Bank trade finance. If
buyer and seller trust each other, cash-in-advance or open account would be a good
choice with a relatively low transaction cost. If sellers don’t trust buyer but believe
the credit of buyer’s bank, bank-intermediated trade finance would come into play.
Figure 1 gives a snapshot of the share of different trade finance around 2008.
It should be noted that there is no comprehensive measure of trade finance, and
most data in this field are either estimation or based on survey report. Despite the
limited data availability, it’s safe to conclude that bank trade finance is important in
facilitating international trade, although its contribution varies in different estima-
tion. For bank trade finance, the most important instrument is Letter of Credit (LC).
Committee on the Global Financial System (2014) estimated that bank trade finance
directly supports about one-third of global trade, with LC covering over half of bank
finance. International Chamber of Commerce (ICC, 2014) has a similar conclusion on
the importance of LC in bank trade finance: in 2013, the share of traditional commer-
cial LC in export and import trade finance is 41% and 36%. Not very surprisingly,
this number has a great variation across region and nation. ICC Banking Commission
(2014) reported that Europe and North America used more of Document Collection
(DC), while Asia-Pacific countries heavily rely on LC, covering 75% and 68% of their
export and import bank trade finance. Niepmann and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2014) em-
pirically studied LC in United States, finding that LC only covers 8.8% of U.S. export
in 2012, though with different degrees across country and industry, varying between
0 and 90%. For example, 30% of U.S. export to China is financed by LC. According
to Niepmann and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2014), the use of LC is highly correlated with
contract environment and rule of law: LC is mostly employed for exports to countries
with intermediate degrees of contract enforcement. It is also used for riskier destina-
tions than DC. In short, LC plays an important role in trade finance, especially for
developing and Asia-Pacific countries.
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3.1 Letter of credit step by step
Figure 2 shows the working mechanism of LC. The following step of LC is in order.
Step 1 Exporter and importer determine terms of trade and sign business contract.
Step 2 Importer would go to issuing bank, show the contract, and apply for LC. The
issuing bank usually asks for a certain amount of collateral from importer before
LC is issued.
Letter of credit is “a commitment by a bank on behalf of the buyer that payment
would be made to the beneficiary provided that the terms and conditions stated
in LC has been met, consisting of the presentation of specified documents” (US
department of commerce). The issuing bank would make payment only a certain
days after shipment, and that’s the maturity of LC, usually around 3 months.
Step 3 The issuing bank would send LC to advising bank for scrutiny.
Step 4 After checking details, advising bank would notify exporter so that he could
prepare shipment.
Step 5 Exporter makes shipment and gets the required document, especially bill of
lading (B/L).
Bill of lading is a document issued by carrier which details a shipment of mer-
chandise and gives title of that shipment to a specified party, usually its holder.
Step 6 Exporter sends required document to advising bank for payment.
Step 7 After checking the required document, advising bank would notify the issuing
bank. In principle, exporter needs to wait until maturity of LC, but he is usually
in urgent need of liquidity, so advising bank would make payment to exporter
at discount.
Step 8 The principle of “borrow short and lend long” makes advising bank unwilling
to hold LC, given its short maturity. Advising bank would sell combine LC
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and other required documents as trade acceptance and sell it to any interested
parties.
The set of documents including LC and B/L is referred to as trade acceptance
or banker’s acceptance, whose payment is guaranteed by both issuing bank and
advising bank, making it attractive for short-term investment.
Step 9 Upon maturity, anyone holding trade acceptance could go to issuing bank for
payment. After checking the required document, issuing bank would notify
importer. The importer then makes payment and gets shipment.
Several comments on LC. First, it’s obvious from the elaborate description that
issuing LC is quite labor-intensive and incurs a large fixed cost for bank, which is
confirmed in Niepmann and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2014) reporting that the top 5 US
bank accounted for more than 92% of LC claims. Second, buyer would not want to
default in this contract environment since that would deny his ownership of shipment.
The actual default rate of LC reported in ICC Banking Commission (2014) is 0.033%
for export and 0.117% for import. Lastly, the currency denominating LC should
have a liquid financial market and low transaction cost so that sellers could be easily
financed. Actually US dollar is still the dominant currency in LC, making up 82% of
total value (ICC Banking Commission, 2014), but the recent rise-up of RMB is also
noteworthy, compromising around 9% of total value.
4 The Model
4.1 Environment
Time is discrete and infinite. There are two countries in the world, 1 and 2, each
populated with a unit measure of buyer, seller, and investor, who live forever with
a discount factor of β ∈ (0, 1). Their identity is fixed over time and their respective
population is σ, σ, and (1− 2σ). In addition, each country has a perfect competitive
banking sector. Each period is divided into three rounds of centralized market (CM),
decentralized market (DM), and financial market (FM). There is divisible and storable
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fiat money circulating in each country, and its total supply evolves according to
Mˆi = (1 + µi)Mi, where Mi is the stock of country i’s fiat money in current period,
and variable with a hat is the level in next period. The growth rate of money supply,
µi, is under the control of central bank.
Here I start with brief introduction on model, and a formal description would
follow. In DM, sellers are specialized in the production of a perishable differentiated
good q but unable to consume it, while buyers are able to consume but couldn’t pro-
duce. Due to imperfect credit and lack of record, a medium of exchange is necessary.
Moreover, q is delivered only at the beginning of next period, and buyers promise to
make payment only then. Assume agents from different countries don’t trust each
other, so international trade settlement is facilitated by bank-intermediated finance.
Buyers ask bank to issue LC, and sellers get immediate liquidity from bank showing
required document of shipment. In FM, only investors could purchase trade accep-
tance from banks. Here trade acceptance is equivalent to a one-period nominal bond
with its total payoff equal buyer’s future payment. At the beginning of next period,
buyers make payment to get q, and investors receive payoff for their holding of trade
acceptance. In the following CM, buyer, seller, and investor engage in the production
of a perishable nume´raire good X and adjust their holdings of fiat money. The timing
of model is depicted in figure 3.
Now I will begin to formalize the setup of physical environment. For tractabil-
ity, assume the instantaneous utility function for buyer, seller, and investor in two
countries is the following
UB = u(q) + U(X)−H
US = −c(q) + U(X)−H
U I = U(X)−H
where q, X, and H capture the amount of specialized good, nume´raire good, and work-
ing hour. While every agent could produce nume´raire good with a linear technology
of X = H, only sellers could produce differentiated good at the cost of c(q). It’s
further assumed that the optimal consumption in CM is X∗, such that U ′(X∗) = 1.
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The conventional assumption on function form also holds, so u(0) = c(0) = 0, u′(0) =
+∞, c′(0) = 0, u′ > 0, u′′ < 0, c′ > 0, c′′ > 0. For notations below, i = {1, 2},
j = {1, 2} 6= i. The real value of country i’s fiat money in terms of nume´raire good
is φi. This model is focused on stationary monetary equilibrium where the aggregate
real balance is constant, therefore 1 + µi =
φi
φˆi
. Central banks adjust home currency
supply through lump-sum transfer to domestic agent when CM opens.
There is separate DM in each country. Buyers could go abroad with a probability
of (1− α) while sellers stay at home. Buyer and seller meet pairwise and at random,
with a matching function ofNi =
BiSi
Bi+Si
, whereNi is the number of successful matching
in country i, with Bi and Si for the number of buyer and seller in country i’s DM.
With this matching function, the number of meeting between country i buyer and
country j seller (nij), as well as the probability for country i buyer to meet country
j seller (pij) could be determined. DM in this model functions as international trade
market. FM is segmented by capital control. The banking sector in country i could
issue LC denominated in its home currency. The total cost (Fi) is assumed to be
fixed to reflect economy of scale. Fi is also a proxy for financial development. FM in
this model represents financial market for short-term investment.
In contrast, CM is open to buyer, seller, and investor from both countries. This
Walrasian market allows agents to adjust their holding of home and foreign currency,
so it’s similar to a frictionless foreign exchange market1. Additionally, since central
bank’s lump-sum transfer is only for domestic agents, extracting seigniorage revenue
through inflation is possible only when a certain currency is demanded by foreigners.
The currency regime is endogenized by seller’s binary choice of settlement currency
2. If financial frictions make international trade unprofitable, international currency
would never emerge. Otherwise, sellers would choose whichever currency that brings
a higher level of profit.
1This is certainly not without loss of generality, as discussed in Geromichalos and Jung (2015)
2Here I assume away the possibility that sellers accept both currencies at the same time, for
two reasons. First, that doesn’t happen very often in reality, given that LC is mostly issued in a
single currency. Second, this assumption makes model tractable in the case of indeterminacy. In
my model, sellers would choose home currency if both currencies bring the same level of positive
profit. In Zhang (2014), accepting home currency doesn’t incur additional information cost for seller,
so accepting both currencies is possible. In this model, accepting home currency is also costly for
international trade, so sellers would choose a single currency for settlement.
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4.2 Optimal choice and equilibrium
4.2.1 CM Value function
Agent’s CM value function differs according to his type. For buyer, he would want to
hold money at the end of CM to enjoy differentiated good in next period, therefore
the CM maximization problem for buyer in country i is
WBi (φim
i
i, φjm
i
j) = max
mˆii,mˆ
i
j ,H,X
U(X)−H + βE[V Bi (φˆimˆii, φˆjmˆij)]
s.t. φimˆ
i
i + φjmˆ
i
j +X ≤ H + φimii + φjmij + Ti
where mij is country i buyer’s holding of country j currency; V
B
i is country i buyer’s
value function for DM trade; Ti is the lump-sum transfer from country i central bank.
This CM value function could be simplified as
WBi = U(X)−X + φimii + φjmij + Ti + max
mˆii,mˆ
i
j
{
βE[V Bi (φˆimˆii, φˆjmˆij)]− φimˆii − φjmˆij
}
With the observation that buyer’s value function is linear in his holding of money,
further simplify this into
WBi (φim
i
i, φjm
i
j) = W
B
i (0, 0) + φim
i
i + φjm
i
j
For sellers, they don’t have any incentive to hold money in CM since the liquidity he
would get from bank is irrelevant with his holding of money. So CM value function
for seller is constant with respect to his own money holding.
With similar notations, the CM value function for country i investor is
W Ii (zi) = max
zˆi,aˆi,H,X
U(X)−H + βE[V Ii (zˆi, aˆi)]
s.t. φizˆi +X ≤ H + φizi + Ti
where V Ii (mˆi, aˆi) is the value function for investor in financial market, related with his
holding of home currency (zˆi) and trade acceptance (aˆi) for next period. Similarly,
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this value function could be simplified into
W Ii (zi) = W
I
i (0) + φizi
4.2.2 Terms of trade in DM
Buyer and seller make a proportional bargaining in DM to determine terms of trade.
Buyer’s utility maximization problem is
max
q,d(m)
{u(q)− φd(m)}
s.t. u(q)−φd(m)
φd(m)− c(q)
β
= θ
1−θ
d(m) ≤ m
where q is the amount of differentiated good sellers would produce; d(m) is the amount
of fiat money buyers would pay to sellers; θ is buyer’s bargaining power. Since buyers
make payment only when q is delivered at the beginning of next period, seller’s surplus
is adjusted by discount factor. The solution is
d(m) =
m∗ if φm >
c(q∗)
β
m if φm ≤ c(q∗)
β
where q∗ is the level of consumption that would maximize total surplus such that
βu′(q∗) = c′(q∗); m∗ is buyer’s payment when total surplus is maximized, so φm∗ =
(1− θ)u(q∗) + θ c(q∗)
β
. It will become clear in equilibrium that buyer’s holding of fiat
money would never exceed m∗, because excessive money doesn’t increase his gains
from trade, but would incur a loss from inflation. Therefore, buyer’s payment to seller
is φm = (1− θ)u(q) + θ c(q)
β
, with q ≤ q∗, βu′(q∗) = c′(q∗).
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4.2.3 Investor decision in FM
Country i investor’s profit maximization problem in FM is
max
ai
{zi + (yi − pi)ai}
s.t. piai ≤ zi
where pi and yi are nominal price and payoff of trade acceptance issued by country
i’s banking sector. Notice that investor is risk-neutral since his CM value function is
linear in z, so he would only want to maximize his expected level of wealth. Individual
investor’s demand for trade acceptance is
ai =
0 if yi < pizi/pi if yi ≥ pi
This result is intuitive: if the payoff is lower than cost, investor’s demand would be
zero. For country i investor, the total demand for trade acceptance is D = (1− 2σ)ai
. The total payoff of trade acceptance in country i should be equal to buyer’s total
payment for international trade settled in country i currency, so the total supply of
trade acceptance is S =
sinjim
j
i+(1−sj)nijmii
yi
.
At equilibrium, if trade acceptance is attractive to investor, its payoff must be no
less than price, so yi
pi
=
sinjim
j
i+(1−sj)nijmii
(1−2σ)zi ≥ 1.
4.2.4 Financial constraint and seller’s decision
More importantly, the addition of bank and investor imposed financial constraint for
monetary equilibrium that allows for international trade. The immediate liquidity
provided by bank must be able to cover seller’s DM cost. Given a perfect competitive
banking sector, zero profit condition holds, so this immediate liquidity is equal to
the proceedings from selling trade acceptance, net of banking sector’s fixed cost.
Consequently, country i seller’s gain from international trade settled in home currency
is
pii ≡
[
1− Fi
(1− 2σ)φizi
](
1
1 +Ri
)
φim
j
i − c(qji )
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where Ri ≡ φiβφˆi − 1 is the nominal interest rate of country i, and q
j
i is country j
buyer’s purchase of differentiated good settled in country i currency.
From this result, seller’s revenue in DM trade is affected by three factors. First,
terms of trade from proportional bargaining, φim
j
i . Second, discount factor of (1 +
Ri)
−1. Finally, financial friction influenced by the fixed cost of banking sector (Fi)
and financial market liquidity of (1 − 2σ)φizi. Intuitively, fixed cost is negatively
correlated with seller’s revenue, while an increase of financial market liquidity could
help improve seller’s profit from DM trade.
As shown later, inflation has negative impact on these factors at the same time.
For terms of trade, higher inflation would reduce buyer’s trade volume and real bal-
ance holding; for discount factor, it erodes the value of future payment; for financial
friction, it tends to depress investor’s confidence, thus lowering their purchase of trade
acceptance. In short, higher inflation would get amplified by financial market and
hugely deteriorate exporter’s welfare.
Similarly, country i seller’s profit from international trade settled in foreign cur-
rency is
pi∗i ≡
[
1− Fj
(1− 2σ)φjzj
](
1
1 +Rj
)
φjm
j
j − c(qjj )
With these in mind, country i sellers choose settlement currency3.
autarky if max{pii, pi∗i } < 0
si = 1 if max{pii, pi∗i } ≥ 0, pii ≥ pi∗i
si = 0 if max{pii, pi∗i } ≥ 0, pii < pi∗i
(1)
Finally, currency regime comes from seller’s decision. If {s1, s2} = {1, 0} or {0, 1},
there’s a single international currency, which case referred to as hegemony from now;
if {s1, s2} = {1, 1}, both currencies become international, and seller would use home
currency for trade settlement, which is producer currency pricing (PCP); if {s1, s2} =
{0, 0}, there are two international currencies, and international trade is settled by
importer’s home currency, which is local currency pricing (LCP). Currency regime is
3Here I didn’t consider the asymmetric case when international trade is profitable for country i
seller but not for country j seller, just for the sake of simplicity. It’s quite easy to include that case
and related discussion would be straightforward.
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summarized in table 2.
4.2.5 Optimal choice for buyer and investor
For buyer and investor, the optimal holding of real balance is available after combining
CM and DM value function. For country i buyer, his DM value function is
V Bi =
(
pii + (1− sj)pij
)(
u(qii)− φimii
)
+ pijsj
(
u(qij)− φjmij
)
+WBi
where (pii + (1− sj)pij
)(
u(qii)− φimii
)
is country i buyer’s expected surplus for DM
trade settled in country i currency, while pijsj
(
u(qij)− φjmij
)
is his expected surplus
for trade settled in country j currency.
Substitute this into the expression of buyer’s CM value function, then his maxi-
mization problem becomes
max
mˆii,mˆ
i
j
{
(βφˆi − φi)mˆii + β
(
pii + (1− sj)pij
)
θ
[
u(qˆii)−
c(qˆii)
β
]
+(βφˆj − φj)mˆij + βsjpijθ
[
u(qˆij)−
c(qˆij)
β
]}
Several conventional observation in monetary search model would also apply here.
For example, the solution for maximization problem requires βφˆi−φi < 0 andm < m∗.
The first order condition for home currency is
Ri = (pii + (1− sj)pij)
[
θ(u′(qii)− c′(qii)/β)
(1− θ)u′(qii) + θc′(qii)/β
]
(2)
This first order condition means buyer’s marginal cost of holding money (Ri)
must be equal to the expected marginal benefit. Notice that buyer’s demand for
home currency is positive since his meeting with domestic sellers would always use
home currency as medium of exchange. This is not true for foreign currency, which
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depends on foreign seller’s decision.
qij = 0 if sj = 0
Rj = pij
[
θ(u′(qij)−c′(qij)/β)
(1−θ)u′(qij)+θc′(qij)/β
]
if sj = 1
(3)
For simplicity, define L(q) ≡ θ(u′(q)−c′(q)/β)
(1−θ)u′(q)+θc′(q)/β as liquidity premium. Apply the same
procedure to investor’s maximization problem, and combine the first order condition
with equilibrium level of yi/pi, I could get investor’s optimal holding of home currency.
zi = 0 if {si, sj} = {0, 1}
Ri =
sinjiφim
j
i+(1−sj)nijφimii
(1−2σ)φizi − 1, otherwise
(4)
This result is also intuitive: if home currency never became international, investor
wouldn’t hold any of that; otherwise, investor’s marginal cost of holding home cur-
rency should be equal to the rate of return from trade acceptance.
Lastly, money market should clear after agents make choice. Consider the case
when international trade is profitable. ∀i, j = {1, 2}, i 6= j
σφim
i
i = φiMi if {si, sj} = {0, 1}
σφim
i
i + (1− 2σ)φizi + Fi = φiMi if {si, sj} = {0, 0}
σφim
i
i + σφim
j
i + (1− 2σ)φizi + Fi = φiMi if {si, sj} = {1, 0}, {1, 1}
(5)
For the first case, country i currency remains national, so its demand comes from
only domestic buyer. For the second case of LCP, its demand comes from home
buyer, home investor, and banking sector. For the last case, home buyer, home
investor, foreign buyer, and banking sector would all demand for country i currency.
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4.2.6 Monetary equilibrium of international trade
With agent’s optimal choice, now it’s possible to define a stationary monetary equi-
librium. My main concern is the emergence of international currency, so I would focus
on the equilibrium that allows for international trade.
Definition 1 A stationary monetary equilibrium that allows for international trade
is a list of time-invariant values including trade volume {qij}2i,j=1, investor’s holding
of real balance {φizi}2i=1, and seller’s choice of settlement currency {si}2i=1 such that,
given other agent’s behavior,
1. Seller’s choice of {si}2i=1 solves (1);
2. Buyer’s choice of {qij}2i,j=1 solves (2)(3);
3. Investor’s choice of {φizi}2i=1 solves (4);
4. Money market clears so that (5) holds.
4.3 Hegemony and incumbency advantage
Now consider the case of hegemony when country 1 currency becomes international
while country 2 currency remains national (s1 = 1, s2 = 0). Could 1 would be re-
ferred to as center country while country 2 as peripheral country. Intuitively, country
1 buyer would never hold foreign currency since his home currency is universally ac-
knowledged and appreciated. In contrast, country 2 buyer would hold home currency
for domestic trade and foreign currency for international trade. Moreover, the single
international currency makes financial market active only in country 1. Consistent
with definition 1, equilibrium condition is explicitly shown in appendix. There is in-
cumbency advantage of country 1 in this international monetary system. Due to the
economy of scale in banking sector, country 2 currency would never become interna-
tional without collective action, government promotion, or a sudden shock that drains
financial market liquidity in country 1. This observation is reflected in proposition 1.
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Proposition 1 If country 1 currency is the only international currency, an in-
dividual seller would never use country 2 currency for international trade settlement.
Proof In this case, country 2 seller couldn’t ask country 1 buyer to pay coun-
try 2 currency since neither buyer or investor in country 1 holds foreign currency. For
country 1 seller, if he accepted country 2 currency for trade settlement, his profit is
pi∗1 ≤  (1− θ)
[
u(q12)− c(q12)/β
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
DM surplus for seller
−F2,
where  is the number of seller trying to accept country 2 currency. If  is not
sufficiently large relative to F2, seller’s profit would be negative thanks to the fixed
cost in the banking sector of country 2.
Notice the difference between this incumbency advantage and the size effect em-
phasized by classical literature. Previous studies often argued that the size effect
of large economy would help lower the transaction cost of its currency in foreign
exchange market, therefore justifying its status of international currency. But propo-
sition 1 shows that economy size alone is not enough. Financial development proves
indispensable.
This situation of hysteresis leaves room for policy intervention. Government could
promote the internationalization of its currency by decreasing F through financial
reform or deregulation. Another possibility is for central bank to absorb financial
friction by becoming market maker. In history, federal reserve took advantage of
both options after 1913, and the rise-up of US dollar was largely attributed to that,
as vividly described in Eichengreen (2011).
4.4 Monetary policy and international trade
With definition 1, the equilibrium condition for hegemony, PCP, and LCP could be
outlined, and comparative statics on monetary policy become possible. On the part
of domestic trade, monetary policy has uniform effect on agent’s welfare level: higher
inflation tends to reduce their gains from trade. On the part of investor, it’s also easy
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to show that higher inflation level erodes confidence and drives down financial mar-
ket liquidity. The effect of monetary policy on international trade, however, differs
according to currency regimes, as shown in proposition 2.
Proposition 2 Under some general assumptions, higher inflation of international
currency would hurt whoever used it for trade settlement.
(i) For hegemony, higher inflation of international currency would hurt importer and
exporter from both countries, i.e.,
∂q11
∂R1
< 0,
∂q21
∂R1
< 0, ∂pi1
∂R1
< 0,
∂pi∗2
∂R1
< 0.
(ii) For PCP, higher inflation of international currency would hurt home exporter
and foreign importer, i.e., ∂pi1
∂R1
< 0,
∂q21
∂R1
< 0.
(iii) For LCP, higher inflation of international currency would hurt home importer
and foreign exporter,i.e.,
∂q11
∂R1
< 0,
∂pi∗2
∂R1
< 0.
Proof in appendix
One interesting observation from proposition 2 is the relationship between nomi-
nal exchange rate and net export. This model is quite silent on exchange rate partly
because, as shown in proposition 1, it’s the incumbency advantage and financial de-
velopment that determines the emergence of international currency. A discussion on
monetary policy and international trade, however, necessitates the inclusion of ex-
change rate. In particular, the possibility of ‘beggar thy neighbor’ through nominal
depreciation would influence the conduct of monetary policy. Now assume Law of
One Price (LOP) for nume´raire good holds in this model, and nominal exchange rate
is ei/j ≡ φjφi , where ei/j is the nominal exchange rate of country i currency per country
j currency. Given that φi = (1 + µi)φˆi in stationary monetary equilibrium, a higher
inflation level of home currency would lead to nominal depreciation, whose effect on
international trade differs according to currency regime.
For hegemony, the result is unclear and contingent on parameter value. For PCP,
higher inflation and home currency depreciation would hurt home exporter and foreign
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importer, thus lowering home export and net export, given that home import is
insulated from this shock. For LCP, home currency depreciation would hurt home
importer and foreign exporter, thus lowering home import and increasing home net
export. Therefore, in this model, ‘beggar thy neighbor’ through nominal depreciation
is possible in LCP, impossible in PCP, and uncertain in hegemony. These observations
are summarized in table 3. Of course, the conduct of monetary policy is over-simplified
in model. In reality, a sterilized FX intervention could depreciate home currency and
stabilize money supply at the same time. A more elaborate model is required for
in-depth discussion.
4.5 Welfare analysis and optimal monetary policy
A prominent advantage of monetary search model is the tractability of agent’s asset
holding and welfare level, which is important for the conduct of optimal monetary
policy if central bank is assumed to maximize the social welfare of its own country.
In this model, social welfare consists of seigniorage revenue, gains from trade, and a
loss from banking sector’s fixed cost if this country issues international currency. For
simplicity, additional welfare gain from consuming nume´raire good is omitted.
If country 1 issues the only international currency, for example, social welfare level
at the end of each period is the following.
W1 = µ1σφ1m
2
1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Seigniorage revenue
+n11
[
βu(q11)− c(q11)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
domestic trade surplus
+n12θ
[
βu(q11)− c(q11)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
importer surplus
+ n21
{[
1− F1
(1− 2σ)φ1z1
]( 1
1 +R1
)
φ1m
2
1 − c(q21)
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
exporter surplus
−F1
W2 =− µ1σφ1m21 + n22
[
βu(q22)− c(q22)
]
+ n21θ
[
βu(q21)− c(q21)
]
+ n12
{[
1− F1
(1− 2σ)φ1z1
]( 1
1 +R1
)
φ1m
1
1 − c(q11)
}
With similar procedure, the welfare level for PCP and LCP is shown in appendix.
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From previous assumptions and proposition 2, each country’s gain from interna-
tional trade is decreasing in the nominal interest rate of international currency. For
seigniorage revenue, recall that central bank’s lump-sum transfer is only applied to
domestic agent, and other agents need to purchase that currency in CM. Therefore,
seigniorage revenue is possible only when there’s foreign demand for that country’s
currency. Without loss of generality, assume seigniorage revenue is increasing in the
growth rate of money supply, which gives incentive to deviate from Friedman rule.
Seigniorage revenue would cancel out in the summation of each country’s welfare,
so Friedman rule is optimal for a social planner trying to maximize total welfare. In
addition, it’s inefficient to issue two international currencies since that would incur
fixed cost of banking sector in both countries. Social planner would let a country
with lower F issue a single international currency. For each country aimed at maxi-
mizing its own welfare, Friedman rule is not optimal if there’s foreign demand of its
currency, which includes the case of PCP and hegemony when a country issues the
only international currency. These observations are summarized in proposition 3.
Proposition 3 In a stationary monetary equilibrium with international trade,
Friedman rule of zero nominal interest rate is not always optimal.
1. For social planner trying to maximize total welfare, Friedman rule is optimal,
and countries with higher degree of financial development would issue international
currency.
2. For central bank trying to maximize the social welfare of its own country, Friedman
rule is not optimal when there’s is foreign demand of its currency.
Figure 4 is shows the second case of central bank faced with a trade off between
seigniorage revenue and gains from trade. It plots the relationship between nom-
inal interest rate and the welfare level of a country that issues the only interna-
tional currency. The function form is borrowed from Lagos and Wright (2005) with
u(q) = ln(q + b)− ln(q), c(q) = q, b = 0.0001. The rest of parameter value is shown
in table 4. Friedman rule is clearly not optimal, since the welfare level is maximized
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around 16% of nominal interest rate. Also, the status of international currency would
be lost if nominal interest rate is raised above 25%, putting a limit central bank’s
conduct of monetary policy, which has been intensively discussed in Zhang (2014).
One interpretation of proposition 3 is to regard international currency as pub-
lic good, in the spirit of Kindleberger (1986). Center country makes investment in
banking sector and financial institution to facilitate trade. Peripheral country takes
advantage of international currency as well as the system of payment and settlement.
Seigniorage revenue conveys negative externality since center country tends to inflate
and overproduce international currency, and that would hurt the rest of world. For a
social planner, that externality is internalized and canceled out, retaining Friedman
rule as the optimal monetary policy.
5 Discussion of related topic
5.1 Size effect
Classical and recent literature uniformly favored large economy as provider of inter-
national currency due to size effect. For example, Devereux and Shi (2013) built a
DSGE model for quantitative analysis, and concluded that large country is in a good
position to provide international currency, since large trade volume would reduce
transaction cost in FX market. In what follows I would use a numerical example to
re-evaluate this issue.
In my model, economy size is approximated by national population, i.e., the total
number of buyer, seller, and investor. A change in population would, according
to matching function, directly influence the number and probability of the meeting
between buyer and seller, thus affecting equilibrium outcome. Figure 5 shows the
relationship for center country’s population and its optimal nominal interest rate.
Parameter value and function forms are identical to those in figure 4. Center country’s
population is ranged from 0.1 to 10, while peripheral country’s population stays at
1. A hump-shape is surprising at first sight, but the composition of center country’s
welfare in figure 6 demystifies everything. In essence, size effect alters the degree of
trade-off between seigniorage revenue and gains from trade. For a large economy,
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gains from domestic trade dominate its total welfare, so higher inflation is not a
good choice. Similarly, gains from international trade compromise the biggest part of
welfare for a small open economy, reducing the attractiveness of reaping seigniorage
revenue. It’s therefore reasonable to think of figure 5 as a continuation of proposition
3 in exploration of center country’s optimal monetary policy. Size effect is crucial
here not because of its absolute value, but in affecting the desirability of seigniorage
revenue: if gains from trade loom larger and larger from size effect, convergence to
Friedman rule becomes a better choice. In other words, it is the structure of economy,
the share of trade in its total welfare, that determines whether a country is qualified
as natural provider of international currency.
To summarize, hegemony is reasonable for a unipolar world dominated by eco-
nomic superpower, while multiple international currencies make sense in a multipolar
world with evenly distributed economy size.
5.2 Economic integration and currency union
Notwithstanding its illustrative nature, this model sheds some light on economic
integration and currency union. Recall that α is the probability for buyer to stay
at home, so greater value of (1 − α) means higher degree of economic integration.
Figure 7 and 8 capture this effect when a single international currency is issued by
center country, where openness of an economy is equal to (1 − α). All parameter
values and function forms are identical to those in figure 4, with the only exception
of α. Clearly, international trade is not a win-win game in this case, partly since it
doesn’t whether buyer is matched with home or foreign seller: economic integration
here implies a higher chance for buyer to meet foreign seller, but the total gains from
trade should be roughly constant. For a social planner adhering to Friedman rule,
this kind of economic integration makes little difference.
The winner and loser in this process of integration, once again, results from the
externality of seigniorage revenue. Center country’s welfare improvement in figure 7
is mainly attributed to a fast increase of seigniorage revenue, which would hurt pe-
ripheral country’s welfare in figure 8. Such observation revives the classical discussion
of currency union in Mundell (1961) that argues for the priority of factor mobility and
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economic integration. The numerical result in this section provides another perspec-
tive: a hegemony system of single international currency would damage peripheral
country’s gain from international trade. The alternative of multiple international
currencies or currency union is justified in promoting social welfare. Of course, the
determinants of currency union include many other factors not explicitly modeled
here, such as institution cost, economy structure, and exchange rate system.
5.3 Capital account liberalization
This model assumed capital control in financial market and mainly focused on inter-
national trade. One interesting question is what will happen if investors are allowed
to participate in the financial market of foreign countries. In other words, what’s
impact of capital account liberalization on international monetary system?
In model, this hardly makes any difference. International trade would not be
affected since it doesn’t matter whether trade is financed by home or foreign investors.
From condition (4), financial market liquidity is the same as before, determined by
trade volume and nominal interest rate. Welfare level and optimal monetary policy
might change since a currency could be demanded by foreign investors, but the net
effect is ambiguous. One argument in favor of capital account liberalization might be
the effect on financial market development: reform and deregulation could help lower
the fixed cost in banking sector, thus improving welfare level.
In reality, capital account liberalization is central to policy discussion. On one
hand, free capital flow certainly helps accelerate the process of currency internation-
alization, since financial transaction has the lion’s share of international currency
use. On the other hand, the risk and uncertainty involved in opening capital account
should never be trifled with. Foreign demand of international currency would com-
plicate central bank’s conduct of monetary policy, and external shock is also going to
be easily transmitted to domestic economy. Overall, a better model tailored to such
discussion directs future research.
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6 Concluding remarks
China has been trying to internationalize RMB since great recession, and several
measures are taken to accelerate this process, including currency swap agreement,
offshore market development, cross-border trade settlement, and capital account lib-
eralization. Among these, trade settlement is a natural starting point given China’s
leading role in international trade of merchandise. In contrast to traditional view
of thick market externality and natural monopoly, recent findings highlight the im-
portance of a deep and liquid financial market. To provide micro-foundation for
such observation, I incorporated financial frictions into the monetary search model in
Zhang (2014). This illustrative model also emphasized government’s role in taking
initiative to foster market, and explored the conduct of monetary policy in different
regimes. Future research could extend to 3-country or N-country model to account for
the emergence of vehicle currency. Modeling financial market in a more meaningful
way is also desirable to discuss asset pricing as well as the impact of capital account
liberalization.
China’s recent campaign of helping RMB join SDR basket reaffirmed its grand
plan of financial reform and deregulation, although the outcome of such bold action
remains uncertain. A monetary system with multiple international currencies is ben-
eficial to United States, who has been long accused of exorbitant privilege, as well
as peripheral countries often criticized for excessive reserve accumulation. Whether
RMB is a qualified candidate in this race to new world, we shall wait and see.
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Appendix
Equilibrium condition of different currency regimes
According to definition 1, the equilibrium condition for country 1 currency to emerge
as the single international currency is the following.
For buyer R1 = (p11 + p12)L(q11) = p21L(q21) (1.1)R2 = p22L(q22) (1.2)
For seller 
pi1 =
[
1− F1
(1−2σ)φ1z1
](
1
1+R1
)
φ1m
2
1 − c(q21) > 0 (1.3)
pi∗2 =
[
1− F1
(1−2σ)φ1z1
](
1
1+R1
)
φ1m
1
1 − c(q11) > 0 (1.4)
For investor
R1 =
n1,2φ1m
1
1 + n2,1φ1m
2
1
(1− 2σ)φ1z1 − 1 (1.5)
For money marketσφ1m11 + σφ1m21 + (1− 2σ)φ1z1 + F1 = φ1M1 (1.6)σφ2m22 = φ2M2 (1.7)
If equations (1.1)-(1.8) are satisfied at the same time, country 1 currency would
emerge as the only international currency. Similarly, the equilibrium condition for
PCP is the following.
For buyer R1 = p11L(q11) = p21L(q21) (2.1.1)R2 = p12L(q12) = p22L(q22) (2.1.2)
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For seller pi1 > 0, pi1 > pi∗1 (2.1.3)pi2 > 0, pi2 > pi∗2 (2.1.4)
For investor R1 =
n21φ1q21
(1−2σ)φ1z1 − 1 (2.1.5)
R2 =
n12φ2q12
(1−2σ)φ2z2 − 1 (2.1.6)
For money marketσφ1m11 + σφ1m21 + (1− 2σ)φ1z1 + F1 = φ1M1 (2.1.7)σφ2m22 + σφ2m12 + (1− 2σ)φ2z2 + F2 = φ2M2 (2.1.8)
For LCP, equilibrium condition is the following.
For buyer R1 = (p11 + p12)L(q11) (2.2.1)R2 = (p22 + p21)L(q22) (2.2.2)
For seller pi∗1 > 0 (2.2.3)pi∗2 > 0 (2.2.4)
For investor R1 =
n12φ1q11
(1−2σ)φ1z1 − 1 (2.2.5)
R2 =
n21φ2q22
(1−2σ)φ2z2 − 1 (2.2.6)
For money marketσφ1m11 + (1− 2σ)φ1z1 + F1 = φ1M1 (2.2.7)σφ2m22 + (1− 2σ)φ2z2 + F2 = φ2M2 (2.2.8)
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Proof of proposition 2
Most of this proof is straightforward except the part of exporter’s gain from interna-
tional trade, which requires additional assumption on function form.
Lemma 1 If exporter’s financial loss is more sensitive than DM cost function in
response to interest rate shock, i.e., (f + c) > 0 , exporter’s gain from international
trade is decreasing in nominal interest rate, i.e., ∂pi
∂R
< 0.
Proof Let βE ≡ (1 − F
(1−2σ)φz )(1 + R)
−1 denote the effective discount factor for
seller. Without loss of generality, assume βE < β so that financial friction would re-
duce seller’s gain from trade. Therefore, (β−βE) > 0 is a measure of seller’s financial
loss. Combine the expression of buyer’s payment in DM and seller’s profit in section
(3.2.4), I could get
pi = βE(1− θ)
[
u(q)− c(q)
β
]
− 1
β
(β − βE)c(q).
Given that ∂φz
∂R
< 0, it’s easy to find that ∂β
E
∂R
< 0. With the previous condition in
proportional bargaining, q < q∗, u′(q∗) = c′(q∗)
β
, u′ < 0, c′ > 0, the first item is
decreased in R.
For the second item, differentiate with respect to R, I could get cf
βR
(f + c), where
f ≡ (β−βE) captures the degree of seller’s financial loss, f ≡ ∂f∂R Rf is the elasticity of
financial loss on nominal interest rate. Similarly, c is the elasticity of seller’s DM cost
in response to interest rate shock. Obviously, f > 0, c < 0. A sufficient condition
for ∂pi
∂R
< 0 is f + c > 0. Therefore, as long as financial loss is more sensitive to the
change of nominal interest rate, higher inflation level would decrease exporter’s gain
from international trade.
Another helpful observation is the property of buyer’s liquidity premium. Recall
its definition.
L(q) ≡ θ(u
′(q)− c′(q)
β
)
(1− θ)u′(q) + θ c′(q)
β
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Take differentiation with respect to q, I could get the following result.
L′(q) =
θ
β
[
(1− θ)u′(q) + θ
β
c′(q)
]−2
(u′′c′ − u′c′′)
With previous assumption on function form, u′ > 0, c′ > 0, u′′ < 0, c′′ > 0, it’s obvious
that L′(q) < 0, so buyer’s liquidity premium is decreasing in his trade volume. After
these preparations, now it’s easy to prove proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 2
On the part of exporters, assume f + c > 0 always holds.
For single international currency
∂q11
∂R1
= ((p11 + p12)L
′(q11))
−1 < 0
∂q21
∂R1
= (p21L
′(q21))
−1 < 0
 ∂pi1∂R1 < 0∂pi∗2
∂R1
< 0
For PCP 
∂q12
∂R1
= 0
∂q21
∂R1
= (p21L
′(q21))
−1 < 0
 ∂pi1∂R1 < 0∂pi2
∂R1
= 0
For LCP 
∂q12
∂R1
= ((p11 + p12)L
′(q11))
−1 < 0
∂q22
∂R1
= 0

∂pi∗1
∂R1
= 0
∂pi∗2
∂R1
< 0
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Welfare level
For PCP, the welfare level is the following.
W1 =µ1σφ1m
2
1 − µ2σφ2m12︸ ︷︷ ︸
Seigniorage revenue
+n11
[
βu(q11)− c(q11)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
domestic trade surplus
+n12θ
[
βu(q12)− c(q12)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
importer surplus
+ n21
{[
1− F1
(1− 2σ)φ1z1
]( 1
1 +R1
)
φ1m
2
1 − c(q21)
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
exporter surplus
−F1
W2 =µ2σφ2m
1
2 − µ1σφ1m21 + n22
[
βu(q22)− c(q22)
]
+ n21θ
[
βu(q21)− c(q21)
]
+ n12
{[
1− F2
(1− 2σ)φ2z2
]( 1
1 +R2
)
φ2m
1
2 − c(q12)
}
− F2
For LCP, welfare level is the following.
W1 =n11
[
βu(q11)− c(q11)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
domestic trade surplus
+n12θ
[
βu(q11)− c(q11)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
importer surplus
+ n21
{[
1− F2
(1− 2σ)φ2z2
]( 1
1 +R2
)
φ2m
2
2 − c(q22)
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
exporter surplus
−F1
W2 =n22
[
βu(q22)− c(q22)
]
+ n21θ
[
βu(q22)− c(q22)
]
+ n12
{[
1− F1
(1− 2σ)φ1z1
]( 1
1 +R1
)
φ2m
1
1 − c(q11)
}
− F2
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Table 1 International function of money
For government For private agent
Store of value international reserve investment instrument
Medium of exchange FX intervention international trade settlement
Unit of account currency anchor denominate financial asset
Table 2 Currency regime
Regime Seller’s choice Description
Hegemony {si, sj} = {1, 0} Country i currency is international
Country j currency is national
PCP {s1, s2} = {1, 1} Two international currencies
Trade settled in seller’s home currency
LCP {s1, s2} = {0, 0} Two international currencies
Trade settled in buyer’s home currency
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Table 3 Monetary policy and international trade
Hegemony PCP LCP
home importer
∂q11
∂R1
< 0
∂q12
∂R1
= 0
∂q11
∂R1
< 0
home exporter ∂pi1
∂R1
< 0 ∂pi1
∂R1
< 0
∂pi∗1
∂R1
= 0
foreign importer
∂q21
∂R1
< 0
∂q21
∂R1
< 0
∂q22
∂R1
= 0
foreign exporter
∂pi∗2
∂R1
< 0 ∂pi2
∂R1
= 0
∂pi∗2
∂R1
< 0
home net export ? ∂NX1
∂R1
< 0 ∂NX1
∂R1
> 0
foreign net export ? ∂NX2
∂R1
> 0 ∂NX2
∂R1
< 0
Notes: Country 1 is regarded as home country. In the first column, country 1 currency emerged
as the single international currency. For the second column, international trade is settled by seller’s
home currency. For the last column, international trade is settled by buyer’s home currency.
Table 4 Parameter choice
Parameter Value Description
1− α 0.5 degree of economic integration
β 0.966 discount factor
σ 0.5 share of buyer
θ 0.5 buyer’s bargaining power
F 0.01 fixed cost of banking sector
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Figure 1 Market share of financing agreement
Source: Asmundson et al. (2011)
Figure 2 Mechanism of LC
Source: adapted from Niepmann and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2014)
Figure 3 Timing of model
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Figure 4 Optimal monetary policy
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Figure 5 Size effect
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Figure 6 Composition of welfare
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Figure 7 Economic integration: center country
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Figure 8 Economic integration: peripheral country
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